Category: Security

It all started with a tweet by Stephane Clavel:

@ioshints @BradHedlund I'm puzzled NSX dFW does not track connections seq #. Still true? To me this is std fw feature.

— stephaneclavel (@stephaneclavel) January 31, 2016

Trying to fit my response into the huge Twitter reply field I wrote “Tracking Seq# on FW should be mostly irrelevant with modern TCP stacks” and when Gal Sagie asked for more elaboration, I decided it’s time to write a blog post.

Harry Taluja asked an interesting question in his comment to one of my virtualization blog posts:

If vShield API is no longer supported, how does a small install (6-8 ESXi hosts) take care of east/west IPS without investing in NSX?

Short answer: It depends, but it probably won’t be cheap ;) Now for the details…

A long time ago in a podcast far, far away one of the hosts saddled his pony unicorn and started explaining how stateful firewalls work:

Stateful firewall is a way to imply trust… because it’s possible to hijack somebody’s flows […] and if the application changes its port numbers… my source port changes when I’m communicating with my web server - even though I’m connected to port 80, my source port might change from X to Y. Once I let the first one through, I need to track those port changes […]

WAIT, WHAT? Was that guy really trying to say “someone can change a source port number of an established TCP session”?

The proponents of microsegmentation solutions would love you to believe that it takes no more than somewhat-stateful packet filters sitting in front of the VMs to get rid of traditional subnets. As I explained in my IPv6 Microsegmentation talk (links below), you need more if you want to have machines from multiple security domains sitting in the same subnet – from RA guard to DHCPv6 and ND inspection.

During my recent SDN workshops I encountered several networking engineers who use Nexus 1000V in their data center environment, and some of them claimed their organization decided to do so to ensure the separation of responsibilities between networking and virtualization teams.

There are many good reasons one would use Nexus 1000V, but the one above is definitely not one of them.

Like all other ipSpace.net webinars, the IPv6 Microsegmentation webinar starts with a brief description of the problem we’re trying to solve: the IPv6 first-hop security challenges.

For an overview of this problem, watch this free video from the IPv6 microsegmentation webinar, for more details, watch the IPv6 Security webinar.

Christoph Jaggi has just published the third part of his Metro- and Carrier Ethernet Encryptor trilogy: the 2015 market overview. Public versions of all three documents are available for download on his web site:

• Introduction to Metro- and Carrier Ethernet Encryption
• Evaluation Guide for Metro- and Carrier Ethernet Encryptors
• Metro- and Carrier Ethernet Encryptors: 2015 Market Overview

The proponents of microsegmentation are quick to explain how the per-VM-NIC traffic filtering functionality replaces the traditional role of subnets as security zones, often concluding that “you can deploy as many tenants as you wish in a flat network, and use VM NIC firewall to isolate them.”

Another question I got in my Inbox:

What is your opinion on NAC and 802.1x for wired networks? Is there a better way to solve user access control at layer 2? Or is this a poor man's way to avoid network segmentation and internal network firewalls.

Unless you can trust all users (fat chance) or run a network with no access control (unlikely, unless you’re a coffee shop), you need to authenticate the users anyway.

Security groups (or Endpoint Groups if you’re a Cisco ACI fan) are a nice traffic policy abstraction: instead of dealing with subnets and ACLs, define groups of hosts and the rules of traffic control between them… and let the orchestration system deal with IP addresses and TCP/UDP port numbers.